Carter’s national energy plan was based on 10 fundamental principles, summarised below:

• Effective and comprehensive energy policy is possible only with government taking responsibility, public buy-in and willingness to make sacrifices.
• Continuation of healthy economic growth is vital, with an effective conservation programme helping to maintain living standards and create employment.
• Wasteful use of resources causes both energy and environmental problems, while conservation can help provide a solution to both.
• There is a need to reduce vulnerability to potentially devastating embargoes by reducing demand for oil, making the most of abundant resources, and developing a strategic petroleum reserve.
• Solutions must be fair, asking equal sacrifices from every region, class of people, industry and interest group.
• A cornerstone of policy is to reduce demand through conservation, being the quickest, cheapest, most practical source of energy.
• Prices should generally reflect the true replacement costs of energy.
• Government policies must be predictable and certain to enable consumers and producers to plan effectively.
• Conservation of the scarcest fuels to maximise those that are more plentiful by matching fuel use to reserves.
• Investment in new sources of energy for the next century’s demand.

In short, 50 years ago, Carter was making his case for a resilient, secure energy system while foreshadowing the fundamental tenets of what we have in more recent years come to understand as the meaning of the term “energy transition”.

This was prescient, and since the US became the largest energy producer in the world, Carter’s recommendations have become even more important for Europe, Asia and other regions than North America. From the early 2020s energy security has moved to the core of policymaking, driven by Covid-19 disruptions, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, extreme weather and the current Strait of Hormuz crisis. Has this focus on systemic resilience in effect overtaken or replaced decarbonisation as the sector’s defining principle for its ongoing transition? And if so, what does this mean for the industry?

How to protect against supply chain interruptions?

Carter’s fourth principle of reducing “vulnerability to potentially devastating embargoes” could not be more relevant today. This applies not just to the ongoing blockages in Hormuz or Chinese restrictions on refined product export blocks, but to any supply chain disruption affecting energy and critical minerals — as of the time of writing, potentially including diesel export bans. Countries turning away from Middle Eastern oil and gas must also acknowledge concentration risks elsewhere: China’s dominance in solar panels and processed critical minerals, or Russia’s share of enriched uranium supply. The IEA reported in 2025 that China leads refining for 19 of 20 key strategic minerals, with an average 70 per cent market share. These minerals are essential for transport, renewable energy, data centres and defence. In response, the US has pursued deals with multiple geographical partners to diversify critical mineral sourcing.

As Carter advocated in principles three, six and nine, any energy security strategy that departs imported hydrocarbon reliance involving clean energy must balance renewable intermittency with battery storage, a diversified energy mix and varied supply chains. Nuclear power has seen renewed interest as a baseload solution, despite longer construction times and higher costs. Data centre power demands are accelerating this trend while also requiring investment in grid infrastructure.

A country’s ability to pivot depends on its existing infrastructure, resource base, unused capacity, energy demand, geography and supply relationships. China exemplifies this multi-pronged approach with an incredible pace of rollout of wind and solar projects meaning achievement of 2030 targets by 2024 and renewable sources now account for 60 per cent of energy supply; nuclear capacity has nearly doubled since 2016; import reserves have been countering supply shocks; and coal has been filling any renewable shortfall. Elsewhere, governments have stimulated clean fuels through regulation and incentives, namely REFuelEU, the (now partly abandoned) Biden-era Inflation Reduction Act, Japanese contracts for difference, alongside carbon taxes. Commercial structural shifts matter too, with the historical spot market approach to LNG having given way to longer-term contracts protecting traders and ultimate offtakers against price volatility. The tools will differ by nation, as will the journey’s length and cost, meaning Carter’s fifth principle of equality of sacrifice across continents remains challenging.

What role does conservation have to play in today’s society?

Turning to Carter’s third and sixth principles and the concept of “strict conservation”, today this means not just efficient use of finite resources but also takes into account the newer technologies and processes being employed across the energy transition sector, being energy recycling, increased storage capacity to smooth everyday and seasonal peaks and troughs, national reserves and converting waste into energy, such as the Hydroprocessed Esters and Fatty Acids pathway turning waste oils into jet fuel. Technological advances will drive further efficiencies and circular economy benefits at both industrial and consumer levels.

Conservation today also means strategic use of existing renewable resources, pipeline and port infrastructure, with hydrogen decarbonising steel production and fuelling freight and aviation. Electrification of cars and, in some cities, entire transit systems, has made energy systems in many countries more efficient, and the increasingly plentiful availability of electricity along with government support is making green hydrogen and its derivative products candidates to replace fossil gas in an increasing range of industrial and transport applications.

The role of energy costs and demands

Energy affordability is critical to both national security and public acceptance of alternative sources. Following escalating geopolitical shocks and their impact on consumers, Carter’s assertion that prices should reflect true replacement costs continues to drive political discussion in many countries. Can traditional energy transition technologies deployed at scale drive prices down over time? Much of the world’s solar industry relies on China precisely because of low panel pricing with solar now the cheapest form of new electricity, with costs falling 60 per cent since 2010.

Demand is equally critical. In 2025 alone, the IEA reported a 17 per cent surge in data centre electricity demand, expecting consumption to double by 2030, with AI-focused centres tripling. Air conditioning demand, currently 10 per cent of annual but 30 per cent of peak electricity consumption, is set to grow by 1,600 terawatt-hours by 2035, which is equivalent to Japan and Korea’s combined annual demand. Political drives to reshore manufacturing will add further pressure.

Certainty of political and legal framework

Carter’s first and eighth principles go to the fundamental need for certainty when attracting investment. Equity investors and lenders alike want to understand the legislative and regulatory landscape before committing capital. For energy projects, this means assessing, among other aspects, a country’s record on contract and financing security enforcement, foreign ownership rules, bilateral investment and tax treaties, currency stability, and the consistency of government policy across changing administrations, as well as the potential risks posed to the environment and local communities, together with sanctions, and trade exposures. Advisers work to address these risks through careful deal structuring, including government commitments where appropriate, to unlock the capital needed for new and expanded projects.

Conclusion

There is no single answer to how nations achieve energy security. With global energy supply in 2025 still 86.2 per cent fossil-fuel based, renewable deployment is nonetheless growing rapidly with solar energy accounting for 81 per cent of all new renewable capacity worldwide in 2024, nearly doubling its presence in three years, according to SolarPower Europe. A multi-sourced strategy coupling decreasing fossil fuel reliance with sustainable production, making best use of existing resources and infrastructure while encouraging capital deployment for new projects and technologies, offers the best chance of achieving an energy supply mix that addresses both security and sustainability. We are continuing down the path of Carter’s 10th principle by investing in tomorrow’s energy sources today, and 50 years later, we have found at least some of the answers. What is needed now is renewed political and commercial focus on frameworks and incentives that will deploy these technologies at scale and minimise national exposure to the increasing geopolitical and climatic events the world faces. Put simply, energy transition is still very much part of the energy security story and has not been usurped by it. They are two sides of the same coin.